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1. Introduction
"In contrast to the failed training programs of the past, a job, most any job, has 
shown itself capable of generating the earnings growth which will make welfare 
reform a reality." Carlos Bonilla, Chief Economist, Employment Policies 
Institute, testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Economic and 
Educational Opportunities, January 18, 1995.
"The vast majority of [welfare mothers we interviewed] who had worked at low 
wage jobs found that hard work at bad wages did not allow them to get ahead." 
Kathryn Edin, Rutgers University, "The Myths of Dependence and Self- 
Sufficiency," working paper, 1994.
Are the poor helped by obtaining any job, or must the job they obtain pay "good" wages? 
The answer to the "wage rate question" is important to designing welfare reform, job training 
programs, and economic development programs. If any job will help, with its starting wage not 
as important, perhaps welfare-to-work and job training programs should push the poor into any 
job. Economic developers should perhaps focus on encouraging job growth of any type. If the 
starting wage rate matters a great deal to the success of the poor, perhaps programs should invest 
more to get the poor into better paying jobs. This might be accomplished through more extensive 
training and education, more selective job placement efforts, and targeting economic 
development at higher wage jobs. These more intensive and selective programs will cost more, 
but the investment may pay off if the wage rate of jobs for the poor makes a major difference. 
In part, the issue is the long-run consequences for the poor of employment at different 
wage rates. Does employment at any wage for the poor pay off in the long-run in earnings 
growth? Or, for a job to pay off in the long-run, must it be a "good" job? As shown in the above 
quotations, opinion is divided about the answers to these questions.
No research has directly addressed this issue of the long-run consequences for the poor of 
employment at different wages. Some research has been done on the long-run effects of youth 
employment and of worker displacement. This research will be briefly reviewed later, but 
findings from research on youth or displaced workers are of unknown relevance for 
disadvantaged adults. Some research has also been done on how wages affect the job retention of 
disadvantaged women who graduate from job training programs. As will be discussed later, 
however, this previous research has focused on the short-term.
Another problem with existing research is its inability to adequately control for 
unobserved personal characteristics of the individual that affect their earnings. A researcher can 
control for observed personal characteristics or fixed characteristics of an individual that affect 
earnings and work hours. But it is more difficult to control for unobserved changes in an 
individual that may lead to changes in their earnings and work hours, and these unobserved 
changes may persist. In other words, it may not be the job itself and the wage paid that affects 
long-run success: it may be the changes that the individual made to get that job that lead to long 
run success. For some policy purposes, it may be useful to know how much an individual's 
changes in earnings and work hours persist. This suggests the long-run effects of a program that 
changes people so they are typical of those who get a job at a particular wage. But for other 
policy purposes, one wants to know what the effect is of the job itself, holding constant both 
observed and unobserved characteristics of the individual. Many policies public employment, 
wage subsidies, many welfare-to-work programs take an individual, without changing their 
skills or attitudes, and put them in a job. To estimate the long-run effects of the job itself, holding
constant unobserved individual characteristics, one must use variables that exogenously shift the 
jobs available to an individual.
This paper examines the long-run effects of employment at different wages using data on 
disadvantaged persons from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). To examine the 
effects of the job itself, holding constant unobserved personal characteristics, the estimation uses 
local demand conditions as instruments to predict individual employment and earnings.
The paper finds, controlling for the observed history and current characteristics of a 
person, very high persistence of changes in employment or wages. This persistence occurs for 
employment at any wage. Higher wage jobs improve future earnings more than low wage jobs, 
but any job helps.. But when the estimation uses local labor demand conditions as instruments, 
only employment at higher wages pays off for disadvantaged persons in the long-run.
2. Rationale for Possible Long-Run Effects of Employment at Different Wage Rates
Why might greater work hours for an individual in the short-run result in greater wages or 
work hours for that individual in the long-run? One reason is that work experience can develop 
general job skills and self-confidence, increasing an individual's productivity. In addition, work 
experience may result in other employers perceiving an individual as more productive. Either 
actual or perceived increases in an individual's productivity may increase their long-run wage 
rate. This increase in wage rates may either increase or decrease labor supply.
Work experience can also develop job skills that are specific job skills: skills that only 
increase productivity at the individual's current employer. Standard economic models of specific 
on-the-job training suggest that it will be optimal for the employer and employee to share the 
greater productivity resulting from firm-specific training. Wages should increase as the 
individual becomes more productive with this firm, to a level that is greater that the worker could 
receive elsewhere, but less than the worker's productive value to this firm. Both the firm and the 
worker will be less likely to terminate the employment relationship and lose the benefits they 
share from the worker's continued employment at that firm. Both wages and work hours should 
be greater in the long-run if the worker stays with the original firm.
Work experience might also alter an individual's preferences. Working more today could 
cause an individual to prefer to choose more work hours in the future.
The above arguments for effects of work experience apply to changes in work hours 
brought about by changes in labor market opportunities. If work hours change due to changes in 
the individual, we would expect these personal changes to persist to some extent in the future. 
For example, an individual might go through a drug treatment program or a job training program, 
and become more able or more motivated to work. Work hours should increase both in the short- 
run and long run. This positive correlation between work hours in the short-run and long-run 
does not occur because more work in the short-run in itself affects work hours in the long-run. 
Changes in the person's skills, attitudes, or self-confidence are causing changes in work hours in 
both the short-run and long-run.
Finally, work hours today could be different for one individual compared to others 
because of choices made in response to different expected life cycle patterns of wages (MaCurdy,
1981). An individual who chooses to work more hours today could do so because of an 
expectation that wages will be lower in the future. More work hours today will be associated with 
lower wages and work hours in the future. This association will not reflect a true causal effect of 
more work hours today, but an optimal choice of work hours.
Why might the wage-rate paid by a job in the short-run be associated with long-run 
differences in work hours or wages? Higher wage jobs could increase the individual's future 
work hours by reducing quit rates and increasing job retention. This increase in job retention will 
result in greater accumulation of general and specific job skills, increasing wages in the long-run. 
This argument assumes that a greater wage in the short-run has positive effects on labor supply.
In addition, higher wage jobs may differ from lower-wage jobs in the opportunities they 
offer for human capital acquisition. Traditional labor economic theory suggests that firms that 
provide more general job training will pay lower wages in the short-run than firms that provide 
less general training, holding constant worker characteristics. The lower short-run wages will be 
accepted by workers because of the prospect of higher future wages, and will be demanded by the 
firm to cover the firm's greater training costs. Unfortunately for this theory, the research literature 
finds insignificant (Parsons, 1990) or significantly positive associations (Lynch, 1992) between a 
worker's current wage and current training activities. An alternative theory is efficiency wage 
theory, which suggests that some firms and industries may offer "better jobs" perhaps including 
both better wages and better training opportunities than are usual in the labor market (Katz and 
Summers, 1989). Firms will offer "better jobs" if the costs are outweighed by the resulting
productivity gains. Productivity gains may occur because better job conditions result in a better 
job applicant pool, lower worker turnover, improved worker morale, and greater incentives to 
work hard to avoid being fired. Firms may differ in their incentives to offer better jobs because, 
among other things, of differences in technology across industries and firms that alter the 
productivity effects of worker quality, turnover, and voluntary work effect. Whether one accepts 
efficiency wage theories or traditional theories of firm-provided general training, wages may be 
correlated with general job training provided. Whichever types of jobs provide more general job 
training will lead to higher wages in the future.
Wage rates may also increase for an individual due to a change in the individual, in 
particular due to some change (a training program?) that increases their productivity. We would 
expect such productivity-induced wage changes to persist to some extent over time. It is not 
really the wage rate of the job today that is causing the higher wages in the future; higher wages 
today and in the future both have a common cause in whatever led to the initial productivity 
increase. Besides a productivity increase, wages might increase for a person due to some change 
in tastes that leads them to choose jobs with lower amenities and therefore higher wages. We 
would expect such taste changes to persist over time, leading to some persistence in wage rates. It 
is not the wage rate of the job itself that increases wage rates in the long-run, but rather the taste 
change that causes higher wages in both the short-run and the long-run.
3. Previous Related Research
No previous research has addressed the issue that is the focus of this paper: the long-run 
effects for disadvantaged adults of employment at different wages. There has been some research 
in three related areas: the long-run effects of worker displacement due to plant closings or mass 
layoffs; the long-run effects of the early employment experiences of youth; the effects of wages 
on job retention for disadvantaged women.
For displaced workers, the consensus until recently, as summarized by Jacobson et al's 
recent book on this topic, has been as follows:" The previous literature provides abundant 
evidence that worker displacement leads to substantial earnings losses....There is less consensus 
in the literature about whether these losses persist." (pp. 33-34, Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 
1993). Jacobson et al report strong new evidence in their book that substantial earnings losses for 
displaced workers persist for at least five years after displacement, for workers in many industries 
and firms. Losses are greater for workers who probably initially received higher wages for 
example, workers in primary metals industries and in larger firms.
The two most prominent research papers on the effects of the out-of-school work 
experiences of youth are by Ellwood (1982) for young men and Corcoran (1982) for young 
women. 1 Both papers attempted to identify effects of "exogenous" changes in employment for 
youth, that is the effects of the employment in and of itself, holding constant observed and 
unobserved personal characteristics. Both papers tried using local demand conditions as
'There is also a research literature on the long-run effects of the in-school work 
experiences of youth, which I do not discuss here, because it seems to raise issues that are 
somewhat different, including the issue of how such work experience might interfere with 
schooling.
instruments, but were unable to get statistically significant results. As an alternative, both papers 
identified the effects of "exogenous" changes in the employment experiences of youth by 
imposing functional form restrictions. Ellwood found only very short-term and limited 
persistence in the work hours of male youths. Early work experience of males was found to have 
major long-run effects on wages. An extra year of work was found to increase wages by 10 to 20 
percent. Corcoran's paper on young women found more persistence in work hours in the short- 
run than Ellwood found for men. She finds strong long-run effects of women's early work 
experience on wage rates, but not as strong as the effects found for men by Ellwood. Neither 
Ellwood nor Corcoran focused on the long-run consequences of different wages during early 
employment experiences.
Two recent studies have examined how the job retention rate for disadvantaged women 
graduates of training programs is associated with the wage rate paid by the job. The Urban 
Institute's study of the Massachusetts' ET welfare-to-work program found that a dollar per hour 
higher starting wage was associated with a 16% longer median employment duration, (p. 126, 
Nightingale et al, 1991). A research study by the 9 to 5 Working Women Education Fund 
focused on women graduates of the federally-funded Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) 
program in Milwaukee and Cleveland. The study found that a dollar higher starting wage 
increased the length of job tenure by half a year. Both studies control for various demographic 
characteristics of the women included in the estimation sample. Neither study uses any statistical 
techniques to control for unobserved differences in the characteristics of these women that might 
be associated with both job tenure and the starting wage. In addition, both studies are short-run
studies: the Urban Institute study focused on women 12 to 16 months after finding a job, 
whereas the 9 to 5 study focused on women an average of 3 years after receiving training.
4. Model and Data
The model is a two equation system using pooled time-series cross-section data on 
individuals. The dependent variables are (1) annual real earnings for an individual, and (2) 
annual work hours for an individual, with seven annual observations on each individual in the 
panel. Individual data come from the Panel Survey on Income Dynamics (PSID), and include 
observations from 1981 to 1987. Estimation is restricted to individuals considered 
"disadvantaged" based on 1973-75 data, and who were prime-age adults for all years from 1976 
to 1987; with this and other data restrictions, 275 individuals are included in the sample. The key 
independent variables of interest are five lagged values of annual real earnings and annual work 
hours for each individual. Other control variables include year dummies, dummies for each 
MS A, individual demographic characteristics, and measures of the individual's economic status 
during the 1973-75 period.
Individuals are considered "disadvantaged," and included in the sample, if their family's 
average income/"needs" during 1973-75 was less than 1.5 and the individual has less than 16 
years of education. "Needs" as defined in the PSID is 25 percent above the usual poverty line for 
the family. Averaging over three years and excluding college graduates focuses on "persistently" 
low income individuals. Individuals were included in the sample only if they remained in the 
same MS A from 1975 to 1987, to make it simpler to define local demand conditions. To avoid
complications from schooling and retirement decisions, individuals were only included in the 
sample if they were between 26 and 55 from 1976 to 1987.2
The two estimating equations can both be written as: 
Yiiw = B0 + B(L)Yim, + B, + Bm +B2*Xim, + B3 *Elml + B4*Dm, +B5*(Dml)(Ei J + uim,
Yjmt= the level for individual / in MS A m in year t of real earnings or work hours.
B(L)Yjmt indicates that five lags in real earnings and hours, each with their own 
coefficient, are included in the equations. Lags of both earnings and hours are included in each 
equation, with either an earnings or hours dependent variable.
Bt and Bm indicates that complete vectors of year dummies and MS A dummies, 
respectively, are included in the equations.
Xjmt = a vector of control variables, including education, experience=age-education-6; 
experience squared; a discrete variable indicating gender; two discrete variables indicating 
whether the individual is Black or Hispanic; marital status; number of children under 18; 
interaction terms between gender, and the marital status and number of children variables.
Eimt is a set of variables describing the individual's economic status during the years from 
1973 to 1975: the average income to needs ratio of the individual's family, average annual real 
earnings and work hours of the individual, and an indicator for the person receiving welfare any 
time from 1973 to 1975.
2In addition to these criteria, individuals must have had no more than 2 years from 1976 to 
1987 in which their earnings or hours variables were subject to "major assignments" by PSID staff.
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Dmt is a set of demand indicators for the individual's MS A, including the log of MS A 
employment, and the average "wage premium" implied by the MSA's industry mix. The average 
wage premium implied by the MSA's industry mix is calculated by multiplying each 2-digit 
industry's share of MS A employment times the industry's national "efficiency wage" premium, as 
estimated by Krueger and Summers (1988).3
(Dmt)(Emit) represents five interaction terms between the local demand indicators and the 
1973-75 economic status variables. These include interaction terms between the log of MS A 
employment and the 1973-75 income to needs ratio and work hours, and interaction terms 
between the MS A wage premium variable and the 1975-75 income to needs ratio, earnings, and 
work hours.
ujmt is the disturbance term.
Earnings and hours are not transformed in these equations by taking the natural logarithm 
(a common practice in labor economics) because many observations have zero earnings and zero 
hours.
Five lags in earnings and hours were included because this seemed to be the maximum 
lags that could be included and still retain a reasonable number of observations for each 
individual. The demographic controls included are standard. Year dummies control for 
unobserved national time period effects on earnings and hours e.g., recessions and recoveries, 
or the national trend toward greater earnings inequality. MSA dummies control for unobserved 
fixed effects of the MSA upon real earnings or work hours, due to differences in local prices,
3Bartik (forthcoming) and Bartik (1993) provide more details on how the 2-digit industry 
share data are constructed and how the wage premium variable is calculated.
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unionization, or wage standards. The log of MS A employment, holding the vector of MS A 
dummies constant, can be interpreted as MSA employment relative to its "average" over the 
sample, and has been shown in previous work to have significant effects on economic outcomes 
(Bartik, forthcoming). The MSA wage premium variable indicates the extent to which the MSA 
employment is concentrated in industries that pay above-average or below-average wages. Again, 
previous research shows that this is often a significant effect upon individual earnings (Bartik, 
forthcoming).
The controls for 1973-75 status attempt to measure "permanent effects" on real earnings 
and hours of indicators of the individual's economic status. They are averaged over three years in 
an attempt to approximate permanent or at least persistent economic status. The interaction terms 
between the MSA demand conditions and these economic status variables are intended to reflect 
variations in the effects of MSA demand conditions for individuals with different initial 1973-75 
economic status. These five interaction terms were chosen after experimentation indicated that 
these five interaction terms had the most consistently significant effects on the dependent 
variable of the various interaction terms considered.4 These "current period" interaction terms are 
needed as controls because lags of these variables are used as instruments, as discussed below.
4Other interaction terms considered were: the interaction between the log of MSA 
employment and the 1973-73 average for real earnings; two interaction terms for the interaction 
between the categorical variable for Black and the two demand indicators; two interaction terms for 
the interaction between the two demand indicators, and the number of kids times the indictor for 
whether the individual was female; a set of three interaction terms for each year in the data set, for 
an interaction between the complete set of year dummies and the 1973-75 averages for earnings, 
hours, and the income/needs ratio. These other interaction terms were generally insignificant or of 
marginal significance. These interaction terms were considered as possible instrumental variable 
candidates when lagged; hence, we would want to include them in the equation in current form, and 
as instruments in lagged form, only when they truly do shift earnings and hours in the sample.
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Estimation
The two equations were estimated in two ways. The first way was to simply estimate both 
equations by seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), allowing for an arbitrary correlation 
between the residuals in the earnings equation and the hours equation. The second way was an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach treating all ten lagged earnings and hours variables as 
endogenous. Variables based on the lagged local demand variables were used as "excluded 
instruments": the instruments excluded from the equation being estimated but included in the 
equations predicting the endogenous variables. These "excluded instruments" include five lagged 
values of the MS A employment and MS A wage premium variables, and five lagged values of the 
interaction terms between these variables and the "permanent" economic status variables. Other 
interaction terms were considered as instruments, but proved to be poor predictors of earnings 
and hours; these other potential instruments were not used to avoid "overfitting" at the first stage 
of instrumental variable estimation.
The first estimation approach, using seemingly unrelated regressions, does not correct for 
the endogeneity of the lagged earnings and hours variables. This approach estimates the 
consequences for future earnings and hours of some change in earnings and hours, holding 
constant many demographic characteristics and the individual's 1973-75 economic status. This 
change in earnings and hours is probably due to some change in the individual.
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The second estimation approach, using instrumental variables, controls for the 
endogeneity of lagged earnings and hours. It measures the short-run and long-run effects on 
earnings and hours of "shocks" to earnings and hours that are associated with local demand 
variation. These are good instruments if local demand variation is a good predictor of individual 
earnings and hours, but is uncorrelated with unobservable individual characteristics that affect 
earnings and hours.
One complication in both estimation approaches is that the residuals in either approach 
will be correlated over time for the same person. Both the SUR and IV estimation approaches are 
therefore adapted to allow for any arbitrary pattern of correlation in the residuals across time for 
the same person. This is done by treating each year as a "separate" equation, restricting all the 
coefficients to be the same across equations, and then telling SAS that the resulting equation is a 
SUR system of 14 equations (seven years times two dependent variables) or a three-stage-least- 
squares (3SLS) system of 14 equations.5
5The actual estimation approach is more complicated than the brief text description because 
of limitations of the SAS program. SAS does not allow 3SLS estimation with separate instruments 
for each equation, which is what is required here. For a particular year, with five lags, we want to use 
instruments whose time period corresponds to those lags. In particular, we don't want to use 
instruments for the five lagged variables if the instruments are dated after the year corresponding to 
the dependent variable. To allow different instruments for each equation, we had to actually create 
the fitted values for each equation using the desired instruments with the "right" lags. These fitted 
values were then used in an OLS procedure to get initially consistent estimates. Residuals were then 
calculated using actual values of the endogenous variables, but the coefficients from the OLS 
procedure, and the correlation matrix of the equation estimates was then calculated. This correlation 
matrix was then imposed on a re-estimation with fitted values reinserted on the right hand side, and 
SAS being told to re-estimate the system using "SUR" with that correlation matrix. This elaborate 
procedure tricks SAS into doing 3SLS with different instruments for each equation.
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Data Description
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics for key variables used in the project. These 
descriptive statistics emphasize that this is a disadvantaged group. Their average family income 
was less than family "needs" over the 1973-75 period. Almost half of the sample received 
welfare at some time during the period. The sample is predominantly Black and female, with an 
average 10th grade education level. Average work hours at the beginning of the sample period 
were less than half of a normal working year (900 out of 2000 "full-time" hours), and average 
real earnings per hour were around $7 (in 1989 dollars).6 Work hours and wages only increased 
modestly during the sample period; by 1987, work hours were slightly over half a normal work 
year, and average wage rates were slightly over $7 ($7.30=$8204/1124).
5. Results
Rather than presenting the coefficients on lagged earnings and hours, which are difficult 
to interpret, I present simulations of the effects of several different hours and earnings shocks. 
These simulations use the original coefficients to show what changes in earnings and hours 
would follow a shock to earnings and hours. The standard errors of the estimated effects in these 
simulations are derived by rerunning each simulation 100 times, with each simulation based on a 
random draw from the joint distribution of all the original coefficient estimates; the standard 
deviation of the estimated effects in these 100 draws is the standard error of these estimated 
effects. Because asymptotically the original coefficient estimates should be distributed normally,
6Prices were adjusted to 1989 "national" dollars using estimated price indices for each MSA 
and each year that were derived in a previous research project. (Bartik, 1993).
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and because the estimates in these simulations are a linear function (a complicated one) of the 
coefficient estimates, the simulation estimates should also be distributed normally.
The simulations consider three possible shocks to annual earnings and annual work hours:
• Case 1 : "Getting a bad job": An increase from zero hours of work to 2000 hours
of work at $5/hour ($10,000 per year);
• Case 2: "Getting a good job": An increase from zero hours of work to 2000 hours
of work at $10/hour ($20,000 per year);
• Case 3: "Getting a significant wage increase": Increase of $5 per hour in pay for
someone working 2000 hours a year ($10,000 per year).
Because of the structure of the model, the effects in Case 2 have to be sums of the effects in 
Cases 1 and 3.
I consider what happens to earnings and hours in all three cases for each of the two 
estimation methods, SUR and 3SLS. As mentioned above, the SUR estimates show what 
happens if an individual changes his or her skills, self-confidence, or attitudes so that higher 
wages or more work hours occur. The 3SLS estimates show what happens if work hours or 
earnings change due to exogenous shifts in the individual's job opportunities, with no other 
change in the individual. The exogenous shifts in job opportunities considered are due to shifts in 
local labor demand conditions. In other words, the 3SLS estimates show the effects of a job in 
and of itself.
I present the results in two ways. Table 2 reports numbers for the effects on earnings and 
hours in the short-run (one year after the initial shock to earnings and hours) and the long-run
16
(10 years after). The figures visually show the actual time path of reaction to the shock. One 
standard error to either side of the estimates is shaded in the figures.
SUR Estimates
Considering first the SUR estimates, the results show that changes in earnings and hours, 
when these changes are attributable to personal changes in an individual, are quite persistent. 
Persistence occurs for both good and bad jobs. A higher percentage of the initial earnings shock 
persists for getting a bad job, although the absolute dollar increase in earnings in the long-run is 
much greater for getting a good job. Perhaps it is more difficult for disadvantaged individuals to 
sustain the personal changes that allowed them to obtain a higher wage job. However, the 
estimates do reveal considerable persistence in maintaining higher wages that occur due to some 
personal change.
Persistence is not 100 percent, and it's possible to look at these estimated effects as 
revealing a glass that is more than half empty. Over time, in all three cases, well over half of the 
initial increase in earnings disappears after 10 years. Much of this loss is concentrated in the first 
year after the shock from a third to a half of the initial increase in earnings disappears after one 
year in the three cases. If the individual is able to avoid this initial depreciation, and maintain the 
job or the higher wage for a second year, the effect on long-run earnings and hours would be far 
greater.
Over time, the effects of getting a job become more concentrated in earnings rather than 
hours. The effect on earnings after 10 years in cases 1 and 2 is a higher percentage of the initial 
shock or the one year effect than is true for the 10-year effect on hours.
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Finally, the effects of wage increases on hours worked appear to be modest in this 
sample. For example, in case 3, the implied wage increases are quite large over $2 per hour 
after one year, close to a 30 percent wage increase. Yet average work hours in year 1 only go up 
by 5 percent or so. This implies a quite modest positive wage elasticity of between .1 and .2.
3SLS Estimates
The 3SLS estimated effects of a shock are similar to the SUR estimated effects in the 
short-run, but much different in the long-run. Getting a job, in and of itself, or getting a wage 
increase, does have significant short-run effects. But the long-run effects of an exogenous change 
in job or wage opportunities are much less than if some personal change led to getting that job or 
wage increase.
Getting a good job has much more persistent effects than getting a bad job. Pushing a 
disadvantaged person into a $5 per hour job, absent personal change, has no important effects on 
their earnings or work hours 10 years later. Providing a disadvantaged person with the 
opportunity for a $10 per hour job does significantly increase their earnings even 10 years later.
Giving someone the opportunity to increase their wage rate also has persistent effects. 
About 10 percent of an initial exogenous increase in the wage rate will still be reflected in higher 
earnings as of 10 years later.
The long-run persistent effects of exogenous shocks to earnings and/or work hours are 
solely on wage rates, not work hours. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that higher
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wage jobs may have greater opportunities for human capital development. The lack of effects on 
work hours could be due to modest labor supply elasticities with respect to wages. Alternatively, 
perhaps the individuals for whom the effects of shocks persist are those who would have 
eventually increased their work hours anyway. The estimates presented here are "average" effects 
of shocks over the entire sample. It is important to remember that these averages probably reflect 
quite different patterns of persistence for different individuals.
Comparison to Previous Research
These estimated effects of exogenous shocks to work hours and earnings appear quite 
consistent with previous research on youth and displaced workers. Exogenous changes in work 
hours do appear to have important long-run effects on earnings for disadvantaged adults, just as 
they do for youth (Ellwood, 1982; Corcoran, 1982) and displaced workers (Jacobson, LaLonde, 
and Sullivan, 1993). The long-run effects on disadvantaged adults of exogenous increases in 
work hours are mostly on wage rates, not on future work hours, just as Ellwood (1982) found for 
young males.
The estimates do not appear consistent with previous estimates that higher wages have 
strong effects on job retention for disadvantaged women (Nightingale et al, 1991; 9 to 5, 1993). 
Even in the SUR estimates, higher wages only appear to have marginal effects on increasing 
work hours in the short-run or in the long-run. The 3SLS estimates imply that higher wage jobs 
in and of themselves are beneficial in the long-run not because of greater job retention, but 
because higher wage jobs increase future wages.
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6. Conclusion
The clearest policy implications of this paper's estimates are for policies that only seek to 
get disadvantaged individuals into jobs, without any direct effort to induce personal change. 
Examples of such policies are welfare -to work programs that lack a significant training 
component, aggressive job placement and job development efforts by welfare or training 
programs, economic development, wage subsidies, or public employment. For these types of 
policies, the estimates imply that employment in and of itself only pays off in the long-run if that 
employment is at higher wages. The payoff to a bad job is only short-run. Therefore, such 
policies must either stress higher wage jobs, or include some type of follow-up component, if 
they are to lead to long-run effects on the earnings of disadvantaged persons.
On the other hand, for policies that can change disadvantaged persons through training, 
counseling, or group work the personal changes that lead individuals to increase their work 
hours may pay off in the long-run even if the job pays poorly. Of course, such efforts toward 
personal change have an even greater long-run payoff if they lead to a higher wage job.
Based on these findings, policies to help the disadvantaged must do more than simply 
push individuals into any job. Policies should stress providing good jobs. Furthermore, policies 
should facilitate the personal changes that lead to employment at higher wages. In addition, job 
retention, especially during the first year after getting a job, is important. Policy makers should 
not count on the job retention problem being solved by high wages. Additional supports to 
increase job retention may be needed.
Finally, future research should explore what features of a job other than its wage are most 
important to long-run success for the disadvantaged. We would like to know how the long-run
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